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The Computer Fraud & Abuse Act:
Failing to Evolve with the Digital Age
W. Cagney McCormick*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet's evolving nature makes it difficult for the United States to
develop and implement electronic criminal and civil laws that protect Ameri-
cans, while continuing to follow constitutional fundamentals. Computer
fraud and cyber attacks are carried out every day against citizens and corpo-
rations while the federal government continues to fight cybercrime with an
inadequate, outdated federal statute. The statute, known as the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), imposes civil and criminal liability on
cybercriminals who undertake Internet attacks on corporations and the gov-
ernment.' However, the use of one statute to prosecute both civil and crimi-
nal cybercrimes distorts its applicability in case law. The CFAA's outdated
language and idea of electronic communications needs to be updated regu-
larly with a proactive mindset instead of the reactive mindset Congress has
been using for decades. This article addresses the CFAA's failure to handle
new developments such as DDoS attacks, hackivists mobs, cyber soldiers/
terrorists and cyber vigilantes and suggests ways to improve the CFAA.
An understanding of the fundamentals of the Internet and identity of
hackers is necessary before an adequate discussion and analysis of cyber-
security law may take place.
II. THE INTERNET
The Internet originated in the late 1960s, but similar systems of inter-
connected computers existed nearly ten years prior.2 The Pentagon developed
the first Internet, and named it ARPANET.3 ARPANET used TCP/IP, the
same underlying protocol for today's modern Internet.4 In 1991, the first
* I would like to thank my wife, Erica McCormick, for her constant encourage-
ment and support. I have the pleasure of working for the Law Offices of
Thomas J. Henry, and I appreciate their continual support of my legal career.
1. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
2. Kelly Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet against Cyberter-
rorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 57, 68 (2010) ("[T]he ARPANET, created by the Pentagon's
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) ... ultimately became the world-
wide system known today as the Internet.").
3. See id. at 67.
4. NSF and the Birth of the Internet-1980s, NAT'L Sci. FOUND., www.nsf.gov/
news/special-reports/nsf-net/textonly/80s.jsp (last visited Oct. 21, 2013); see
also The Internet Celebrates 30 years of TCP/IP Dominance, V3.Co.UK, http://
www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/the-frontline-blog/2233373/the-internet-celebrates-30-
years-of-tcp-ip-dominance.
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worldwide web page launched after the National Science Foundation began
to connect other countries to the United States' Internet.5
By 2009, Internet e-commerce contributed approximately $1.67 trillion
to the world's gross domestic product ("GDP")-only slightly more than Ca-
nada's $1.34 trillion GDP that same year. 6 In 2010, e-commerce comprised
almost 4.7% of United States' GDP, an estimated $684 billion.7 Today, more
than two billion people use the Internet to annually exchange more than $8
trillion.8
A. How the Internet Works
The Internet works by using protocols to send data. The two protocols
enable data, which is broken down into small packets of information, to ar-
rive at the destination in an understandable format.9 Transmission Control
Protocol ("TCP") decomposes data into packets and ensures that they are
properly reassembled at the destination.o Internet Protocol ("IP") guides or
routes the packets of data through the Internet.l IP is essential to almost all
Internet activities, particularly those that require sending data (such as e-
mail).12 Data is transmitted based on IP addresses, which are a series of num-
bers regulated by the Domain Name System (DNS).13 The DNS maps IP
numbers into recognizable sets of letters, words or numbers.14 Hackers often
disrupt the DNS flow by flooding the system with information, multiple re-
quests or by gaining access to the system and corrupting or destroying the
information that it contains.15
5. Id. ("The first Web page was launched on Aug. 6, 1991.").
6. Annalyn Censky, Internet Economy: Bigger Than Canada, CNN MONEY (May
26, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/26/technology/internet-economy
gdp/index.htm.
7. Marissa Brassfield, Internet Economy Statistics: How Does Online Business
Measure Up to US GDP?, PAYSCALE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.payscale.
com/career-news/2012/03/internet-economy.
8. Censky, supra note 6.
9. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBER-






15. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 30.
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III. PROFILE OF A HACKER
The perpetrators of hacking crimes are usually juveniles and young
adults.16 They tend to be male, bored with school or work, nonsocial, and
have few outside activities.17 "According to the United States Sentencing
Commission, between 1988 and 1996, 80% of all perpetrators of computer
crime had no prior criminal history and over 60% had at least some college
experience or were college graduates."I8 As that study suggests, the early
1990s typical American profile of a hacker was a young, well-educated citi-
zen with minimal (if any) criminal history. These hackers were typically mo-
tivated by a desire for the excitement or mental challenge, rather than
money.19
The profile of a hacker has broadened as the Internet continues to
grow. 20 "The [hacker] profile now includes disgruntled employees, foreign
spies, fraud perpetrators, political activists, conventional criminals, terrorists
and very young juveniles."21 These hackers like to brag or even taunt law
enforcement and their victims with their exploits.22 The increase of identity
theft cases has created an additional profile of identity theft hackers, who are
only out for money and are more sinister than conventional hackers.23
There are several types of cybercriminals: script kiddies, hackers, hack-
tivists, cyber vigilantes and cyber terrorists.24 As the name implies, script
kiddies are usually young and inexperienced. They use free downloadable
virus programs to attack others.25 Script kiddies lack coding skills sufficient
to understand the effects and side effects of the hack.26 Rather than write
code, they reproduce old code.27 Often these reproductions can leave signifi-
cant traces, which leads to their detection.28 True "professional" hackers
16. Scott Tulman, Unique Characteristics of Computer Crime Prosecutions and






22. Tulman, supra note 16, at [2].
23. Id.
24. See Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Com-




28. Skibell, supra note 24, at 919.
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make the code script kiddies use, and are distinguishable due to their higher
level of sophistication and hacking skill.29
Hacktivists use their skills in furtherance of their beliefs or against op-
ponents of their beliefs.30 Similar to hacktivists, cyber vigilantes believe they
are fighting back against bad people.31 Cyber vigilantes attack identity hack-
ers, child pornography exploiters, kidnappers, and the like.32 Cyber terrorists
attack a country or a group of people in support of their own beliefs and look
to cause great harm or damage in the attack.33 The term "cyber terrorist" is
theoretical, as there are no known incidents where cyber terrorists have at-
tacked the public, or have accepted public liability.34
B. Cyber Attacks
1. Vulnerabilities in Software
In 2003, a Congress Research Service Report ("the Report") explored
the reasons why computer attacks were successful.35 The Report found that
computer hackers opportunistically scan the Internet for computer systems
that lack necessary or current software security patches or those with im-
proper computer configurations, which leave them vulnerable to potential se-
curity exploits.36 The Report ultimately blamed computer owners-both
individuals and corporations-for failing to take necessary steps to maintain
their security.37 However, the report mentions that even up-to-date computer
software security patches may still be vulnerable to a type of attack known as
a "zero-day exploit."38
29. Id.
30. See Mark G. Milone, Hacktivism: Securing the National Infrastructure, 58
Bus. LAW. 383, 385 (2002).
31. See Steiger v. United States, 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003) (Alabama citizen
arrested after anonymous Turkish hacker found child pornography on citizen's
computer and sent images and the associated computer IP address to local law
enforcement); Morris v. United States, 549 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 2008) (citizen
arrested for attempting to have sex with minor after the minor's parent created
a fake myspace account and pretended to be a fifteen year old female, inter-
ested in consensual sex).
32. Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1042-45; Morris, 549 F.3d at 549-52.
33. Gable, supra note 2, at 57.
34. Id.
35. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL 32114, COMPUTER ATTACK AND
CYBER TERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5
(2003).





A zero-day exploit occurs when a computer hacker discovers a new vul-
nerability and launches a malicious attack program onto the Internet before
the software vendor can create and provide a protective security patch to
protect software users. 39 Therefore, the Report concedes that the average
cybercriminal cannot be stopped due to the constant possibility of new vul-
nerabilities in all software.40 Fortunately, the expertise needed to hack all
software is hardly ubiquitous. Unfortunately, as the report implies, anything
that was digitally created can be jailbroken, cracked, pirated, hacked and
reproduced.41
Though it is not possible to completely eliminate vulnerabilities, there
are practical ways to reduce them.42 Vulnerabilities persist largely as a result
of poor security practices and procedures, inadequate training in computer
security, and poor quality in software products.43 For example, often within
companies and organizations the IT specialists do not install timely security
patches.44 Another example is that commercial software vendors consistently
release products with vulnerability-creating errors.45 Government observers
have reportedly stated that approximately eighty percent of successful intru-
sions into federal computer systems can be attributed to software errors, or
poor software quality.46
There is no current regulatory mechanism or legal liability for software
manufacturers who sell defectively designed products.47 Often the licensing
agreement contains a disclaimer protecting the software vendor from all lia-
bility.48 In a trend that has continued to grow since 2003, the CRS Report
stated that many software manufacturers contract the development of large
portions of their software code to foreign nations.49
2. Planning a Computer Attack
The five basic steps hackers use to gain access to a computer are: recon-
naissance, scanning, gaining access, maintaining access, and covering
tracks.50 Automated tools created by professional hackers (such as spyware)
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. WILsoN, supra note 35, at 13.
42. Id. at 15.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 16, 34.
45. Id. at 34.
46. Id.
47. WILSON, supra note 35, at 34.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 15.
50. Id. at 36, 37.
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usually accomplish the majority of these five basic steps. 51 Reconnaissance
involves employing extensive surveillance to find detailed information about
the computer user or company. 52 Hackers commonly do this by tricking users
or employees into sharing sensitive information.53 Other methods include
dumpster diving and finding old hard drives or unshredded information.54
Once inside, the hacker begins scanning the network for entry points.
Scanning is an arduous process and sometimes lasts months.55 After develop-
ing an inventory of the software and network vulnerabilities, a hacker gains
access to the network and decides what kind of attack he or she may want to
carry out.56 Maintaining access is another key step for a hacker.57 Hackers
want to maintain access so they can come and go. Often hackers will try to
make themselves "system administrators" so they can maintain access.58 Ex-
perienced hackers will cover their tracks after maintaining and gaining access
to a network.59 Often these hackers will change the computer logs with
hacker-constructed "root kits" or "Trojan horse" to evade detection or even
wipe the hard drives.60
3. Types of Cyber Attacks
Computer software and hardware has evolved at an amazing rate, but
vulnerabilities are still present according to the CRS Report for Congress.61
Cybercrime is committed by a number of different attacks that continue to
evolve with the evolving web and tech hardware. 62 The seven most popular
cybercrime methods of attack for hackers are: (1) worms; (2) viruses; (3)
spyware; (4) bots; (5) Trojan horses; (6) identity spoofing; and (7) distributed
51. Id. at 36.
52. Id.
53. WILsoN, supra note 35, at 36.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 36, 37.
56. Id. at 37.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. WILsoN, supra note 35, at 37.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 14. See also Bhakti Satalkar, Types of Computer Attacks, BUZZLE (June
13, 2011), http://www.buzzle.com/articles/types-of-computer-attacks.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2013).
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denial of service attacks.63 Within these seven popular attacks, various other
alterations of these attacks make up many more attacks.64
Cyber attacks occur when a computer is infected with a malicious
payload program that corrupts data or manipulates the system or network.65
Downloading malicious code or visiting malicious websites that secretly
download the code can infect computers. 66 Worms are self-replicating pro-
grams that spread through email address books to attack specific vulnerabili-
ties in software.67 Viruses are malicious programs that attach themselves to
executable (.exe) files.68 When a computer user downloads a program from a
website or P2P program, a virus could be attached.69 Trojan horse viruses
("Trojans") disguise themselves within working software like screen savers
or games. 70 Once the Trojan is copied on a system hard drive, the Trojan
kicks in and infects the system.7' Spyware is a surveillance program that
secretly records and automatically transmits keystrokes, passwords, and other
information back to a remote attacker.72 Compromised computers can be
used as zombies or "bots" which can go undetected and transmit data.73
Often these "bots" are used in the worst of cyber attacks in distributed-de-
nial-of-service attacks.74
The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team released an
unclassified report on DDoS attacks describing them as the "most significant
cyber threat to businesses, local and federal government agencies."75 A
DDoS occurs when an attacker commands a number of computers to send
numerous requests to a target computer. 76 The overwhelming flood of re-
quests can cause the website or computer network to shut down; alterna-
tively, the target may be unable to handle the request of legitimate users,
63. Satalkar, supra note 62.
64. Id.
65. WILsON, supra note 35, at 28.
66. Id.





72. WILSON, supra note 35, at 29.
73. Id. at 27.
74. Id.
75. Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/STO4-015.
76. Id.
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much like a freeway traffic jam.77 The zombie computers, or "bots," are often
used as the soldiers in this type of attack.78 Experienced hackers can use a
combination of all of these types of attacks in order to gain and maintain
entry in committing cybercrimes.79 Criminal software, or "crimeware," has
become increasingly available on the cyber black markets and can enable a
potential adversary to rent a botnet or execute a DDoS attack.o "It is only the
inadequacy of the criminal code that saves the hackers from very serious
prosecution."81
IV. FLAWS IN THE LAW
A. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
"The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") is the cornerstone of
the federal government's strategy for combating computer crime."82 The
original version of the Act was written by Congress in 1984 and has been
revised frequently.83 The first revision occurred in 1986 after the original
CFAA was widely criticized for vagueness. 84 The 1986 amendments broad-
ened'the scope of the CFAA by adding computer fraud and hacking as of-
fenses.85 These new offenses included a mens rea of "intentionally," rather
than the original and less burdensome mode of culpability requirement
"knowingly."86 In 1996, another revision again changed the mens rea require-
ments of the CFAA by completely restricting subsection (a)(5), consequently
creating two felonies and one misdemeanor to cover a wide range of crimes
and, thus, applied a different mens rea to each offense.87 The first felony
required an intentional act of damaging a computer by knowingly transmit-
ting a harmful program.88 The second felony applied to persons who inten-
tionally access a computer without authorization and recklessly cause





81. Ken Thompson, Reflections on Trusting Trust, 27 Comm. ACM 8 (1984).
82. Skibell, supra note 24, at 910.
83. Id. at 944.
84. Id. at 912.
85. Id. at 913.
86. Id. at 913-14.
87. Id. at 915.
88. Skibell, supra note 24, at 915.
89. Id. at 915-16.
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without authorization and negligently causing damage.90 Therefore, the 1996
CFAA amendment unequivocally broadened the applicability of the statute
by expanding the mens rea requirement.91 The last major revision came as a
result of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 which raised the maximum penal-
ties for violating the CFAA's felony provisions from five to ten years; maxi-
mum punishment for repeat offenders was raised from ten to twenty years. 92
The USA PATRIOT Act imported the definition for "loss," as created in
United States v. Middleton in 2000.93 Section 1030(e)( 11) states the term
"loss" can represent the cost of damages, any lost revenue or costs associated
with an interruption in service, and the damages from a single attack may be
aggregated across many computers. 94
The current CFAA punishes seven computer criminal offenses. First, the
CFAA is applicable when a computer user trespasses into the United States
government's cyberspace.95 This section condemns hacking any computer
that holds a federal government interest-not exclusively computers owned
by the federal government. 96 This offense merely requires the intentional and
unauthorized access of information-no damage is required-of a govern-
ment computer maintained exclusively for the use of the federal government
or a government computer partly used by or for the federal government with
such access affecting the federal government. 97 The second offense is the
theft of information by unauthorized computer access.98 This offense is
aimed to protect three types of government information: information on the
federal government; consumer credit or another form of financial informa-
tion; and information acquired through interstate or foreign access.99
A hacker who causes damages without authorization to access a com-
puter faces criminal charges under section 1030(a)(5) and computer fraud
subsection 1030(a)(4).oo Section 1030(a)(5) describes cyber attacks as
worms and viruses; however, any type of cyber attack that creates an aggre-
gated loss greater than $5,000 in a non-government computer during a one-
year period after the attack will fall under this section as a federal crime.IOI
90. Id. at 916.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 917.
93. See United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2000).
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1 1) (2006).
95. See id. § 1030(a)(3).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
99. See id.
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5).
101. See id. § 1030(a)(4).
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To prosecute under section 1030(a)(5), a hacking crime must satisfy the
$5,000 loss requirement or reach a special government interest.102 Modifica-
tion or impairment to medical examinations or information is considered
damage, and causing physical injury to any person or threatening public
health or safety will impact the applicability of section 1030(a)(5).103 The
damage has to be made on a "protected computer."104
Five types of protected computers are listed: 1) computers used by or
for the U.S. government; 2) computers used for or by a financial institution;
3) computers whose damage affect the U.S. government interest; 4) com-
puters whose damage affect financial institutions; and 5) computers used in
interstate or foreign commerce or communications.105 The other type of dam-
age under the CFAA is computer fraud.106 Section 1030(a)(4) bans fraud by
computer intrusion.107 The four crucial elements to this offense are: 1)
"knowingly" with intent to defraud; 2) accessing a protected computer; 3)
"without authorization" or "exceeding authorization;" and 4) furthering a
fraud or obtaining anything of value.108 An interesting exception in exists in
section 1030(a)(4): when a defrauder only obtains use of your computer and
the time of use is valued less than $5,000 in a one-year period.109 Without
satisfaction of this threshold damage amount, a prosecutor would likely have
to seek a state charge for computer abuse.
A hacker who uses his hacking skills with the intent to extort money,
traffic sensitive passwords, or spy on the United States are the final three acts
prohibited by the CFAA.llo Subsection 1030(a)(7) states that no one shall
"transmit in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing
any threat to cause damage to a protected computer" for the purpose of ex-
torting from any person."' Additionally, subsection 1030(a)(6) forbids traf-
ficking in computer access or passwords)12 Trafficking references
transferring, disposing, or obtaining control with the intent to make a transfer
or disposal.'13 The computer passwords or keys must be used either to attack
a federal computer or in a manner that affects interstate or foreign com-
102. Id.
103. Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i).
104. Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).
105. Id. § 1030(e)(2).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(2).
107. See id. § 1030(a)(4).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. § 1030.
111. See id. § 1030(a)(7).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6).
113. Id. § 1029(e)(5).
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merce.114 Computer espionage is outlawed in section 1030(a)(1), which spe-
cifically bans any disclosure of information detrimental to the United States'
national defense.' 5
B. Judicial Interpretation
CFAA litigation has included numerous disputes attempting to define
the scope of a user's authorization when that user uses a computer to damage
digital information or use it "without authorization" or when "exceeding au-
thorized access."116 Particularly, defining a violation of "'exceeding authori-
zation" has been the more difficult task.17 When an employee has
permission to access the entire network, exceeding authorization can be in-
creasingly difficult to define for particular offenses. Significant portions of
the CFAA are automatically not applicable to an employee who has complete
computer access, such as the company's lead computer engineer. For in-
stance, section 1030(a)(3) does not apply to an employee if federal informa-
tion is accessed while having the authorization to do so because there is no
trespass of government cyberspace.'t' Similarly, section 1030(a)(2)(A-B) is
not applicable if the stolen information is not property of a financial institu-
tion or department of the United States.119 Therefore, only section
1030(a)(2)(C) would apply because the employee exceeded authorization of
"any protected computer;" however, courts have had differing views on how
to apply the definition of "exceeding authorized access" provided in section
1030(e)(6).120
The first case to try and define the scope of authorization under the
CFAA was Morris v. United States.121 Robert Morris was a graduate student
at Cornell University who created a worm designed to exploit several weak-
nesses in certain targeted programs and the Internet.122 Morris accessed sev-
eral Ivy League networks to study cybersecurity.123 Once Morris released the
worm it quickly multiplied across the United States, even though he never
intended to cause extensive damage.124 Morris' unsuccessful appeal claimed
114. Id. § 1030(a)(6).
115. See id. § 1030(a)(1).
116. See id. § 1030.
117. See id.
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
119. Id.
120. See Morris v. United States, 928 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1991).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 505.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 506.
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he never intended to cause the amount of damage required by the CFAA.125
From Morris' appeal, the Second Circuit developed the Intended Function
Test to determine when access was unauthorized.126 Unauthorized access is
found when a defendant does not use the features in the attacked program or
network "in any way related to their intended function."27 The Intended
Function Test created a workable definition to both "unauthorized access"
and "exceeding authorization."128 The Fifth Circuit accepted this test in
United States v. Phillips.129 In Phillips, the court stated the typical analysis
begins with "the scope of a user's authorization to access a protected com-
puter on the basis of the expected norms of intended use or the nature of the
relationship established between the computer owner and the user."130
Subsection 1030(e)(6) defines "exceeds authorized access" as the
"means to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to
obtain or alter information in the computer that the person with access is not
entitled to obtain or alter."31 While the Intended Function Test creates a test
to determine when a user has made unauthorized attempts to access a com-
puter or network, courts have continuously found it difficult to decide when a
user has exceeded authorization when the user did not "alter" or "obtain" any
information.132 The issue "is whether 'authorized access' or 'authorization'
may encompass limits placed on the use of information obtained by permit-
ted access to a computer system and data available on that system."33
The circuit courts are split as to whether an employee has exceeded
proper authorized access when there are no limits to the authorization.134 The
majority view, supported by the Fifth Circuit, follows the Intended Purpose
Test.135 Using authorized confidential information exceeds authorization
"when the user knows or reasonably should know that he or she is not au-
thorized to access a computer and information obtainable from that access in
furtherance of or to perpetrate a crime."136 Therefore, the misappropriation of
non-government company information is a criminal offense under the CFAA
125. Id. at 507.
126. Morris, 928 F.2d at 510.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 509.
129. United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Phillips, 477 F.3d at 220; see also Morris, 928 F.2d at 508.
133. See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010).
134. See Lavon, 597 F.3d at 271; see also LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d
1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2009).
135. See Lavon, 597 F.3d at 289.
136. Id. at 271.
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when considering the Intended Purpose Test, even if the misappropriation
does not involve a criminal scheme.137 The Fifth Circuit explained, "the con-
cept of 'exceed[ed] authorized access' may include exceeding the purposes
for which access is 'authorized.' Access to a computer and data that can be
obtained from that access may be exceeded if the purposes for which access
has been given are exceeded."138
The First and Seventh Circuits have similarly accepted an agency-prin-
ciple-based standard in civil cases.139 The First Circuit has held an employ-
ment agreement to potentially establish the guidelines for "authorized"
access under the CFAA.140 The Seventh Circuit held a defendant breaching
his duty of loyalty terminated his agency relationship, and with it, his author-
ity to access a laptop or company network.141 Hence, the defendant's basis of
authority existed only through his employee-employer relationship.142 The
standard applied in criminal cases within these two circuits has found access
to exceed authorization under the CFAA when an authorized user violating
the company's employment agreement, regardless of criminal intent, has
misappropriated information from a company's digital database.143
The minority view rejects the argument that one authorized to obtain
information stored in a computer exceeds authorized access when breaching
a duty of loyalty to an employer by accessing and using such information to
further his independent interests.144 The minority view, promulgated by the
Ninth Circuit, holds that an employee with authority to access his employer's
computer system does not violate the CFAA when using his privilege for the
misappropriation of accessible information.145 A Second Circuit district court
attacked the Intended Purpose Test by claiming there is "no statutory lan-
guage that supports interpreting the CFAA to reach misuse or misappropria-
tion of information that is lawfully accessed."46 Moreover, the court stated
this standard would require "an analysis of an individual's subjective intent
137. Id.
138. Id. at 272.
139. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583-84 (1st Cir.
2001); see also Int'l Airport Ctrs., v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir.
2006).
140. Explorica, 274 F.3d at 582.
141. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21.
142. Id.
143. See generally id.
144. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting
the plain meaning of CFAA indicates that authorization depends on actions
taken by the employer, not whether an employee breached a state law duty of
loyalty to an employer).
145. Id. at 1137.
146. United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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in accessing a computer system."147 Agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, the
court asserted, "an interpretation of the CFAA based upon agency principles
would greatly expand the reach of the CFAA to any employee who accesses
a company's computer system in a manner that is adverse to her employer's
interests."l48 Thereby "convert[ing] an ordinary violation of the duty of loy-
alty or of a confidentiality agreement into a federal offense."49
Supporters of this view insist the CFAA legislative history demonstrates
it was intended to prohibit electronic trespassing or hacking, not the misuse
of information.150 This minority view permits a defendant the opportunity to
raise a defense in each circuit court, and a potentially provides an opportunity
of appeal to the United States Supreme Court.15, Nevertheless, neither the
Supreme Court nor Congress has shown interest in settling this dispute. De-
spite missed opportunities, modifications may be made to ensure the CFAA
is properly applied, consistently enforced, and effectively protects
Americans.
V. CREATING AN EFFECTIVE CFAA
A. Increased Punishment Ranges
Increasing the maximum punishment under the CFFA from twenty
years to thirty years imprisonment will improve the CFAA, in part, by deter-
ring more cybercriminals. Although increasing the maximum punishment to
thirty years incarceration may be considered harsh, it should be available
(and applicable) only in cases of the most heinous cybercriminals and organi-
zations. Primarily, the punishment increase would affect cyber organizations,
which are on the rise, and should be reserved for those who attack the United
States and mega-corporations, subsequently causing millions of dollars in
damage. For demonstration, the following would effectively target, and re-
strict its abuse, the application of the maximum thirty-year sentence. An indi-
vidual is subject to a maximum of thirty years imprisonment, when acting
alone or in a group, such individual participates in a computer attack without
access authorized by a United States government institution or American
business and whose participation results in damages exceeding $1 million.
For decades laws have existed to fight against traditional crime organi-
zations; there should similarly be laws aimed to protect against organized
cybercrime because the law-particularly penal codes-must evolve to ad-
dress how technological advancements have impacted society and the appli-
cability of existing law. A single hacker is dangerous; one hundred organized
hackers can instantaneously devastate a conglomerate's website or network.
147. Id. at 193-94.
148. Id. at 194.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 192.
151. Id. at 194.
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Anonymous-the world's most infamous hacker cyber organization-is de-
monstrative of organized hackers' capabilities.152 In April 2011, in just a few
short minutes, members of Anonymous brought down Sony's PlayStation
Network for weeks and reportedly took millions of credit card numbers as
"trophies."153 Over the past two years, Anonymous has attacked conglomer-
ates, countries, and foreign politicians as "hackivists" fighting for privacy
rights and freedom.154 PayPal, Amazon.com, MasterCard, and the Church of
Scientology have all had their websites disabled by "denial of service" at-
tacks by members of Anonymous.155 Anonymous has become known as a
loose group of hackers with cells around the world.156 Brazilian, Iranian, and
Turkish government websites have all faced attacks by members of Anony-
mous in protest of Internet censorship as well as election fraud.157 Thus, a
new anti-cybercrime organization subsection is needed in the CFAA to ad-
dress the growing technological capabilities of hacking mobs like
Anonymous.
B. Explicitly Include Denial of Service Attacks as Violation
In order to address the current incongruity between the intent and appli-
cation of the CFAA, a new subsection should be added to expressly prohibit
denial of service attacks. A DDoS attack is meant to flood a website with
thousands of request to make the website fold under the pressure and prevent
legitimate use.158 Denial of Service Attacks can be carried out without the
need to gain "unauthorized access."'59 Originally, hackers would use a virus-
type program to make the infected computer a "bot" to make requests at any
website targeted by the hacker.160 The unauthorized access into the infected
"zombie" computer does violate the CFAA but the request to the targeted
152. CBS News: "Anonymous" Hacker: We Can Shut Your Website (CBS television
broadcast July 19, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563-
162-20080814.html.
153. Icar Paneda, Spain Arrests Anonymous Members over Sony Hack (June 10,
2011), http://uk.reuters.con/article/2011/06/10/uk-spain-anonymous-idUKTR
E7593FZ20110610.
154. CBS News: "Anonymous" Hacker, supra note 152.
155. Paneda, supra note 153; see also CBS News: "Anonymous" Hacker, supra note
153 ( "[A] 'denial of service attack,' [is] whe[n] hackers overwhelm websites
with a huge volume of requests for information crashing down the company's
Web site.").
156. Paneda, supra note 153.
157. See generally id.
158. Milone, supra note 30, at 389.
159. See generally id.
160. Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/STO4-015.
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website has nothing to do with "authorized access."61 Hackivists groups like
Anonymous now make botnet programs in which members or followers can
download in order to freely make that computer a "zombie" with the consent
of the user.162 Hackivists believe this is a way to legally protest against a
company's website.163 Outlawing this type of protest would send a clear mes-
sage to hackivists.
A DDoS attack is prosecuted under section 1030(a)(5), which states it is
a crime to "knowingly cause the transmission of a program, information,
code or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally cause dam-
age without authorization, to a protected computer."64 However, a hackivist
lead DDoS attack, like Anonymous advocates, has authorization to make the
botnet infected computer a "zombie" and the CFAA should not apply be-
cause there is no "damage without authorization" on the targeted website. In
this type of DDoS attack, proper "authorization" is never requested or at-
tempted upon the targeted website.165 Another issue in section 1030(a)(5)(A)
is whether the targeted website has experienced any "damage."66 The web-
site is made inoperable because the servers can no longer handle the
thousands of request made by the botnet computers due to the lack of
bandwidth the website runs. This "damage" refers to the limits of technology
setup by the company and the financial cap the targeted company decided to
invest in the website.167
Since section 1030(a)(5)(A) does not apply to DDoS attacks-like those
carried out by Anonymous-the CFAA should be amended, or another stat-
ute should be enacted, to apply to DDoS attacks. In 2006, the United King-
dom created a new denial of service attack act called the Police and Justice
Act 2006 amending Britain's Computer Misuse Act that was created before
the days of the Internet.168 The amendment covered all types of DDoS attacks
by stating that a person is guilty of an offense if the individual makes unau-
thorized acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to impairing; by
161. See generally Graham Cluley, Are DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) At-
tacks Against the Law?, NAKED SECURITY (Dec. 9, 2010), http://nakedsecurity.
sophos.comi/201 0/12/09/are-ddos-distributed-denial-of-service-attacks-against-
the-law/.
162. See generally id.
163. See generally Pierluigi Paganini, Hacktivism: Means and Motivations ... What
Else?, INFOSEC INST., (Oct. 2, 2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/
hacktivism-means-and-motivations-what-else/.
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
165. Cluley, supra note 161.
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
167. See id




operation of a computer impairs the operation of any program or data, pre-
vents or hinders access to any program or data held in any computer; and/or
impairs the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such
data.169 The key component applying to DDoS attacks is the preventing or
hindering of access to any program or data held in any computer and the
impairment of the reliability of any such data.170 A similar addition to the
CFAA by the United States Congress would send a strong message to hack-
ivists groups like Anonymous.
C. Develop an Appropriate Suppression Remedy
The CFAA and other Internet surveillance laws have one giant glaring
hole: there is no suppression remedy against hacker vigilantes.171 "A defen-
dant charged with a crime can sue the government for civil damages if the
FBI violates the surveillance laws to catch him, and can sue ISPs and other
third parties if they violated the surveillance laws as well, but he cannot rely
on those violations as a basis for suppression of the evidence against him."72
The Internet surveillance laws consist of the CFAA, Pen Register Statute,
Stored Communications Act, and the Wiretap Act; and within the Internet
context, none of these have a suppression remedy.173
The CFAA does not have any statutory language giving a defendant an
option for suppression if an individual's expectation of privacy was violated
on his computer by a hacker.174 The Fourth Amendment allows state and
federal law enforcement to go freely into public spaces that are not protected
by a "reasonable expectation of privacy."175 Generally, a search warrant is
required when law enforcement expects to enter into a private area. 76 In
contrast, a search by a private person does not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment, unless he acts as an instrument or agent of the government.177 There-
fore, incriminating evidence discovered by a vigilante hacker-later
submitted to police-on a hacked computer would not be subject to suppres-
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
172. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression
Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGs L.J. 805, 806-07
(2003).
173. Id. at 814-15.
174. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
175. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
176. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
177. United States v. Ford, 765 F.2d 1088, 1089-90 (11th Cir. 1985).
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sion under the Fourth Amendment, unless the hacker was a government
agent.178
The Eleventh Circuit was faced with whether evidence submitted to law
enforcement from an anonymous hacker's discovery of a defendant's child
pornography on his computer was admissible under the current Internet sur-
veillance laws.179 The court ruled the Internet hacking vigilante was not an
agent of the government, and the current Internet surveillance laws did not
prevent a private individual from "hacking into personal computers to re-
trieve information stored therein."180 As such, current case law does not pro-
vide a suppression remedy to a vigilante hacker victim.181
Internet vigilante issues have primarily stemmed from child pornogra-
phy and solicitation cases. 182 The Seventh Circuit has stated, "[o]n-line vigi-
lantism against pedophiles, in fact, has taken on unexpected proportions."83
Discussing the lack of a suppression remedy against Internet intrusions, the
court added, "If the law wants to deter private sting operations, real or phony,
the way to do that is by imposing criminal liability on private parties who
encourage crimes."184 Further, "U]ust as there is no defense of private entrap-
ment . . . there is no exclusionary rule applicable to evidence obtained im-
properly by private persons."85 A suppression remedy against hackers
attacking Americans would fall well within the intended purpose of the
CFAA. The CFAA already outlaws vigilante hackers.186 A suppression-reme-
diless CFAA is a violation of the privacy fundamentals the Constitution is
meant to protect. Digital records are kept in most aspects of an American's
life and every American is at risk to exposure by vigilante hackers until an
appropriate suppression remedy exists.
D. Federal Regulatory Commission
To deter and limit cybercrimes, the government should create a regula-
tory commission to oversee the software industry, which could eliminate
some software vulnerabilities.187 At a minimum, the government should cre-
ate code guidelines for developers to follow. Allowing companies to out-
source their code production also puts American computer users at risk for
178. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003).
179. Id. at 1050.
180. Id. at 1049.
181. Kerr, supra note 172, at 807.
182. See Morris v. United States, 549 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 2008).
183. Id. at 551.
184. Id. at 552.
185. Id.
186. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
187. See WILSON, supra note 35, at 3.
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cybercrimes and, on a much larger scale, cyber terrorism.188 A regulatory
committee would be able to create security processes to better protect against
such crimes.189 The committee could recommend strategies to prevent
software companies from escaping legal responsibility for design defects
often financially crippling companies when code is exploited.190
E. Separate Criminal and Civil Statutes
The CFAA applies to both criminal and civil cases. The more these
types of cases are litigated, the more likely definitions and concepts appropri-
ate for either criminal or civil cases are applied in the wrong context. 191 The
CFAA would be more effective legislation if the statute was separated for
distinct criminal prosecution and civil application. Courts would then be able
to accurately apply the proper standard in civil and criminal cases. The
CFAA, at its creation, did not need a separate criminal and civil section. But
the evolving digital world has grown more sophisticated and complicated;
hence it necessitates bright line rules for the continued development of case
law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CFAA should be expanded to represent the digital age in which we
live. One federal statute is inexplicably inadequate to cover the expansive
number of different cybercrimes. Continued amendment and expansion to the
CFAA risk unnecessarily increasing complexity in exchange for civil and
criminal applicability. A fair and impartial trial is a fundamental right en-
compassed in the Bill of Rights.192 By allowing evidence illegally obtained
by vigilante hackers to be admissible is a great departure from the fundamen-
tal rights the Founding Fathers sought to protect.193 All Americans should
have available an adequate suppression remedy to protect against vigilante
hackers. A society full of smartphones, smart televisions, PRISM, tablets,
and Wi-Fi deserves, and requires, better federal statute protections. Congress
must respond to the evolution of the Internet and technology by dissecting
and resurrecting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Congress must respond
with the explicit intention of protecting the different electronic frontiers our
society has created.
188. Id at 21.
189. Id. at 22.
190. See id. at 6.
191. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
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